J. N. Crossley [1] raised the question of whether the implication 2 + A = A ⇒ 1 + A = A is true for constructive order types (C.O.T.'s). Using an earlier definition of constructive order type, A. G. Hamilton [2] presented a counterexample. Hamilton left open the general question, however, since he pointed out that Crossley considers only orderings which can be embedded in a standard dense r.e. ordering by a partial recursive function, and that his counterexample fails to (...) meet this requirement. We resolve the question by finding a C.O.T. A which meets Crossley's requirement and such that 2 + A = A but 1 + A ≠ A. At the suggestion of A. B. Manaster and A. G. Hamilton we easily extend this construction to show that for any n ≧ 2, there is a C.O.T. A such that n + A = A but m + A ≠ A for 0 < m < n. Hence, Theorem 3 of [2] and all of its corollaries hold with the new definition of C.O.T. The construction is not difficult and requires no priority argument. The techniques are similar to those developed in [3], but no outside results are needed here. (shrink)

Why and under what conditions are individuals altruistic to family and friends in their social networks? Evolutionary psychology suggests that such behaviour is primarily the product of adaptations for kin- and reciprocal altruism, dependent on the degree of genetic relatedness and exchange of benefits, respectively. For this reason, individuals are expected to be more altruistic to family members than to friends: whereas family members can be the recipients of kin and reciprocal altruism, friends can be the recipients of reciprocal altruism (...) only. However, there is a question about how the effect of kinship is implemented at the proximate psychological level. One possibility is that kinship contributes to some general measure of relationship quality (such as ‘emotional closeness’), which in turn explains altruism. Another possibility is that the effect of kinship is independent of relationship quality. The present study tests between these two possibilities. Participants (N= 111) completed a self-report questionnaire about their willingness to be altruistic, and their emotional closeness, to 12 family members and friends at different positions in their extended social networks. As expected, altruism was greater for family than friends, and greater for more central layers of the network. Crucially, the results showed that kinship made a significant unique contribution to altruism, even when controlling for the effects of emotional closeness. Thus, participants were more altruistic towards kin than would be expected if altruism was dependent on emotional closeness alone – a phenomenon we label a ‘kinship premium’. These results have implications for the ongoing debate about the extent to which kin relations and friendships are distinct kinds of social relationships, and how to measure the ‘strength of ties’ in social networks. (shrink)

Cooperation requires that individuals are able to identify, and preferentially associate with, others who have compatible preferences and the shared background knowledge needed to solve interpersonal coordination problems. The present study investigates the nature of such similarity within social networks, asking: What do friends have in common? And what is the relationship between similarity and altruism? The results show that similarity declines with frequency of contact; similarity in general is a significant predictor of altruism and emotional closeness; and, specifically, sharing (...) a sense of humor, hobbies and interests, moral beliefs, and being from the same area are the best predictors. These results shed light on the structure of relationships within networks and provide a possible checklist for predicting attitudes toward strangers, and in-group identification. (shrink)

What are the limits of physical computation? In his ‘Church’s Thesis and Principles for Mechanisms’, Turing’s student Robin Gandy proved that any machine satisfying four idealised physical ‘principles’ is equivalent to some Turing machine. Gandy’s four principles in effect define a class of computing machines (‘Gandy machines’). Our question is: What is the relationship of this class to the class of all (ideal) physical computing machines? Gandy himself suggests that the relationship is identity. We do (...) not share this view. We will point to interesting examples of (ideal) physical machines that fall outside the class of Gandy machines and compute functions that are not Turing-machine computable. (shrink)

There is an intensive discussion nowadays about the meaning of effective computability, with implications to the status and provability of the Church–Turing Thesis (CTT). I begin by reviewing what has become the dominant account of the way Turing and Church viewed, in 1936, effective computability. According to this account, to which I refer as the Gandy–Sieg account, Turing and Church aimed to characterize the functions that can be computed by a human computer. In addition, Turing provided a highly convincing (...) argument for CTT by analyzing the processes carried out by a human computer. I then contend that if the Gandy–Sieg account is correct, then the notion of effective computability has changed after 1936. Today computer scientists view effective computability in terms of finite machine computation. My contention is supported by the current formulations of CTT, which always refer to machine computation, and by the current argumentation for CTT, which is different from the main arguments advanced by Turing and Church. I finally turn to discuss Robin Gandy's characterization of machine computation. I suggest that there is an ambiguity regarding the types of machines Gandy was postulating. I offer three interpretations, which differ in their scope and limitations, and conclude that none provides the basis for claiming that Gandy characterized finite machine computation. (shrink)

Chinese translation courtesy of Zhuanxu Xu. We want to know what gender is. But metaphysical approaches to this question solely have focused on the binary gender kinds men and women. By overlooking those who identify outside of the binary–the group I call ‘genderqueer’–we are left without tools for understanding these new and quickly growing gender identifications. This metaphysical gap in turn creates a conceptual lacuna that contributes to systematic misunderstanding of genderqueer persons. In this paper, I argue that to better (...) understand genderqueer identities, we must recognize a new type of gender kind: critical gender kinds, or kinds whose members collectively resist dominant gender ideology. After developing a model of critical gender kinds, I suggest that genderqueer is best modeled as a critical gender kind that stands in opposition to `the binary assumption', or the prevalent assumption that the only possible genders are the binary, discrete, exclusive, and exhaustive kinds men and women. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper a relational account of incongruent counterparts is defended against an argument due to Kant. I then consider a more recent attack on such an account, due to John Earman, which alleges that the relationalist cannot account for the lawlike left--right asymmetry manifested in parity-violating phenomena. I review Hoefer's, Huggett's and Saunders' responses to Earman's argument and argue that, while a relationalist account of parity-violating laws is possible, it comes at the cost of non-locality.

In the dissertation I examine the split between cognition and eros in Kant's notion of objectivity, which has become paradigmatic for modern theories about knowledge. I argue that the split between cognition, on the one hand, and feelings and desires, on the other, does not capture the necessary conditions of knowledge, as Kant claims, but involves a suppression of erotic factors of existence. ;The split between pure knowledge and sensual existence in Kant's thought reflects an ascetic tradition inherited from both (...) Greek and Christian sources, which views the body, sexuality, and in particular women's sexuality as a source of pollution. According to this tradition, since thought must be divested of the pollution of sensuous existence, women's sexuality precludes them from rational activity. Consequently, the philosophical commitment to purity has justified the exclusion of women from the practice of knowledge. ;The particular form of asceticism which is evident in Kant's treatment of sensibility of objective knowledge, of morality, and of aesthetic judgement, reflects the reified nature of relations in an emerging capitalist economy. The suppression of the immediate, sensual qualities in both the subject and object of knowledge, in Kant's system, corresponds to the suppression of the immediate, qualitative features of the subject and object in the process of commodity production. Both persons and things become reduced to a formal abstract equivalence. Kant's notion of objectivity makes normative this objectification of relations between persons and things. ;Thus, the paradigm of objective knowledge is not only damaging to the thinker, who must detach himself from the emotional and sensual facets of existence. It serves as an ideology which has justified the exclusion of women from the pursuit of knowledge, and which more generally legitimates the distorted human relations generated by the world of commodity production. ;By considering Kant's commitment to pure knowledge in the context of the genealogy of the concept of purity, the themes of asceticism and fetishism emerged as mutually illuminating. Implicit in the ascetic denial of sensuality is a dialectic which leads to an objectification of persons and things. Moreover, the fetishism of commodities involves a detachment of erotic interests from persons which results in an obsessive interest in objects. (shrink)

One of the most important students of Franz Brentano was Anton Marty, who made it his task to develop a philosophy of language on the basis of Brentano’s analysis of mind. It is most unfortunate that Marty does not receive the attention he deserves, primarily due to his detailed and distracting polemics. In the analysis presented here his philosophy of language and other aspects of his thought, such as his ontology , are examined first and foremost in their positive rather (...) than critical character. The analysis is moreover supplemented by translations of four important works by Marty, including his entire work On the Origin of Language. These are in fact the first English translations of any substantial writings by him. The resulting picture that emerges from the analysis and translations is that Marty has much to say that proves to be of enduring interest for the philosophy of language on a range of topics, especially the meanings of statements, of emotive expressions, and of names as regards both their communicative and their ontological aspects. The volume will be of interest not only to philosophers and historians of philosophy, but also to historians of linguistics and psychology. (shrink)

This paper is part of a broader project whose aim is to present a coherent unified approach to natural language dialogue semantics using tools from type theory. Here we explore aspects of our approach which relate to situation theory and situation semantics. We first point out a relationship between type theory and the Austinian notion of truth. We then consider how records in type theory might be used to represent situations and how dependent record types can be used to model (...) constraints on situations. We then sketch treatments of attitude phenomena for which Barwise and Perry proposed situation semantic analyses (perception complements, belief, the Pierre puzzle) as well as two other intensional phenomena (intensional verbs and intentional identity). Finally we give a characterisation of the type theory used and a small illustrative fragment of English. (shrink)

Reviewed Works:Andrew Hodges, Rolf Herken, Alan Turing and the Turing Machine.Stephen C. Kleene, Turing's Analysis of Computability, and Major Applications of it.Robin Gandy, The Confluence of Ideas in 1936.Solomon Feferman, Turing in the Land of O.Martin Davis, Esther R. Phillips, Mathematical Logic and the Origin of Modern Computers.

Excerpt from La Théorie Platonicienne des Idées Et des Nombres d'Après Aristote: Étude Historique Et Critique La théorie phtonioionno de l'amour. Vol. Ia-8 de la Collection historique des grands philosophes 3 fr. 75. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the (...) aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Philosophische Texte sind alles andere als leichte Gutenachtlektüre. Kein Wunder, denn hier kommt es buchstäblich auf jeden Buchstaben an. Transzendent ist noch lange nicht transzendental! Und absolut nicht absolutistisch! Zum Glück gibt es einen Wegweiser im Dschungel des Fachchinesisch. "Philosophische Grundbegriffe für Dummies" liefert Definitionen und Erläuterungen von A bis Z und in verständlicher Sprache. Finden Sie heraus, warum die Fetzen fliegen, wenn ein Rationalist und ein Empirist sich streiten!

The notion of »the problematic« has changed its meaning within the history of power and knowledge since the early 20th century, leading up to today's performative, neocybernetic fascination with generalized management ideas and technocratic models of science. This book explores central scenes, conceptual elaborations, and practical affiliations of what historically has been called »the problem« or »the problematic«. By way of considering modes of problematization as modes of inhabitation, intervention, and transformation the contributions map its current conceptual-political uses as well (...) as onto-epistemological challenges. Thus, »problematization« is positioned as a critical concept that links, often in intricate ways, several currents from speculative philosophy to the formation of interdisciplinary fields. The »problematic«, as it turns out, has been the source of change in philosophy and the sciences all along. (shrink)

Strafen ist ein Alltagsphänomen. Nicht nur der Staat droht normübertretenden Bürgern Strafen an, auch Eltern können ihre Kinder, Lehrer ihre Schüler und Partner einander durch soziale Sanktionen wie den Entzug von Anerkennung oder soziale Ausgrenzung strafen. Weil Strafen oft mit der Zufügung erheblichen Leidens einhergehen, sind sie rechtfertigungsbedürftig. In diesem Buch wird die in der Philosophie seit jeher thematisierte Frage nach der Rechtfertigung staatlichen wie sozialen Strafens erneut gestellt. Klassische philosophische Positionen zum Problem der Strafrechtfertigung werden kritisch rekonstruiert, um diejenigen (...) Elemente in ihnen zu isolieren und zusammenzuführen, die sich als kritikresistent erweisen. Das Resultat ist eine Theorie, die am Präventionsgedanken als Kriterium der Strafrechtfertigung orientiert ist, aber zugleich an einer Vergeltungstheorie in einer spezifischen Lesart, nämlich als einer Theorie des Strafverstehens, festhält. Sie unterscheidet zwischen nicht-moralischen Gründen für das Strafen und moralischen Gründen dagegen und erkennt an, dass es ein nicht aufhebbares Spannungsverhältnis zwischen zweckrationalen Gründen für das Strafen und moralischen Gründen dagegen gibt. (shrink)

One explanation for drug bans is that regulators know more than consumers about product quality. But why not just communicate the information in their ban, perhaps via a “would have banned” label?Because product labeling is cheap-talk, any small market failure tempts regulators to lie about quality, inducing consumers who suspect such lies to not believe everything they are told. In fact, when regulators expect market failures to result in under-consumption of a drug, and so would not ban it for informed (...) consumers, regulators ex ante prefer to commit to not banning this drug for uninformed consumers. (shrink)

Arthur Diamond comments that "it is not clear how a donor distributes money through Hanson's market". Let me try again to be clear. Imagine David Levy were to seek funding for the regression he suggests in his comments, on the relative impact of sports versus science spending on aggregate productivity. Consider what might happen under three different funding institutions.

Considers the social and political significance of Kristeva’s oeuvre.